Before delving into the primary evidences of Islamic law—namely the Qur’an, Sunnah, Ijmāʿ, and Qiyās—classical scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh established a series of foundational discussions known as mabādiʾ. These preliminaries serve to prepare the student intellectually and methodologically for understanding how legal rulings are derived.
From these discussions is one of the most foundational debates in Islamic intellectual history: the issue of taḥsīn and taqbīḥ (moral valuation of actions).
The central question is whether actions are intrinsically good or evil, or whether they only become so through divine revelation. Closely related to this are several key theological questions: Is gratitude to the One who bestows blessings obligatory even without revelation? Are people morally accountable before a prophet is sent? Can the intellect independently recognize moral responsibility? These issues deeply affect theology, law, ethics, and even daily religious practice.
Objective and Subjective Morality: Framing the Debate
At the heart of taḥsīn and taqbīḥ lies a broader philosophical question: Is morality objective or subjective?
Objective morality asserts that certain actions are inherently right or wrong, regardless of time, place, or perspective. Subjective morality, on the other hand, holds that moral judgments depend on individuals or cultures and can vary accordingly. While subjective morality is often defended by pointing to historical and cultural differences, this argument fails upon closer inspection. The mere existence of differing practices does not prove their moral validity.
Moreover, complete moral relativism is practically unworkable. No society can function without moral absolutes, as laws themselves are rooted in the assumption that certain actions—such as murder or theft—are definitively wrong. Even those who advocate moral subjectivity routinely impose their own moral judgments on others, revealing an internal inconsistency.
Islam’s Balanced Approach to Morality
Islam does not fully endorse either extreme. Instead, it adopts a nuanced and balanced position. Some moral truths are objective and unchanging, such as the goodness of tawḥīd and the evil of shirk. Other rulings, however, are subject to divine wisdom and may change across different communities or time periods. Many legal rulings in Islamic law fall into this latter category.
For example, certain practices permitted in earlier revelations were later prohibited, and vice versa. Even actions like killing can be moral or immoral depending on context, such as in cases of just retaliation (qiṣāṣ) or warfare versus unjust aggression. Thus, morality in Islam is neither purely fixed nor purely relative; rather, it is guided by revelation while acknowledging context and divine wisdom.
The Three Meanings of Taḥsīn and Taqbīḥ
Classical scholars clarified that disagreements over taḥsīn and taqbīḥ often arise from failing to distinguish between their different meanings. These meanings can be grouped into three categories.
The first relates to human inclination and aversion. Actions are described as good if they naturally attract people due to benefit, and bad if they repel them due to harm. All scholars agree that the intellect can independently recognize this type of goodness and badness.
The second meaning concerns perfection and deficiency. Qualities such as knowledge, justice, and generosity are recognized by reason as perfections, while ignorance, injustice, and miserliness are deficiencies. Again, there is universal agreement that the intellect can discern this without revelation.
The real point of dispute lies in the third meaning: whether an action deserves praise or blame in this world and reward or punishment in the Hereafter. Here, scholars diverge on whether the intellect alone can make this determination, or whether revelation is required.
Scholarly Positions on Moral Accountability
The Ashʿarī Position
The Ashʿarī school maintains that moral accountability—meaning entitlement to reward or punishment—can only be established through revelation. While the intellect can recognize benefit, harm, perfection, and deficiency, it cannot independently determine that an action merits divine reward or punishment. According to this view, legal and moral obligation only applies after revelation has reached a person.
The Muʿtazilī Position
The Muʿtazilah argue that the intellect can fully determine moral value, including deserving praise or blame and reward or punishment. They hold that certain actions are inherently obligatory or forbidden, even before revelation. From this perspective, individuals can be held accountable for failing to act justly or gratefully even if no prophet has reached them.
However, they do not claim that all actions fall into this category. Instead, they classify actions into four types, ranging from those that are clearly good or evil by reason alone, to those whose moral status can only be known through revelation.
The Māturīdī Position
The Māturīdī school takes a middle position. It agrees that the intellect can recognize that an action deserves a certain ruling, but it insists that only revelation actually establishes the ruling itself. In other words, reason identifies moral suitability, but divine law confers legal and eschatological consequence. This distinction preserves both the role of reason and the authority of revelation.
Notably, this position was favored by later scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim.
Practical Implications of the Debate
The most significant outcome of this disagreement concerns accountability before revelation. According to the Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs, moral and legal responsibility depends on the arrival of divine message. According to the Muʿtazilah, certain obligations exist regardless of revelation due to rational necessity.
Despite these differences, all schools agree that the majority of detailed legal rulings—such as prayer, fasting, zakāh, and ḥajj—can only be known through revelation. These are not accessible through reason alone and belong to the domain where Sharīʿah is indispensable.
Conclusion: Why This Discussion Matters
The debate over taḥsīn and taqbīḥ is not an abstract philosophical exercise. It shapes how Muslims understand accountability, ethics, divine justice, and the relationship between reason and revelation. It also provides intellectual clarity when engaging modern moral challenges, especially those rooted in relativism and secular ethics.
By carefully distinguishing between different types of moral judgment and recognizing the limits and strengths of human reason, Islamic scholarship presents a coherent moral framework—one that is anchored in revelation while remaining intellectually rigorous and deeply human.
This foundational discussion prepares the ground for understanding legal rulings not as arbitrary commands, but as part of a divinely guided moral order that harmonizes reason, revelation, and lived
